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Abstract
Does IFI funding provide support to SMEs receiving such funding? We
assess the impact of funding by the European Investment Bank (EIB) on
the performance of 5,223 SMEs in eight countries of Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) during 2008-2014. Our results, derived from propensity score
matching and difference-in-difference estimation exercises, indicate that EIB
lending has a positive effect on employment, revenues and profitability. This
positive effect holds irrespective of the economy entering a prolonged crisis
or a seeing a recovery in the years following EIB funding. Overall, our
results provide support to the view that IFI funding makes a difference in
a period characterized by financial and economic turmoil.
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1 Introduction
Development and promotional banks are thought to play an important cat-
alytical role in supporting development in specific sectors (Anginer et al., 2011;
Griffith-Jones et al., 2017; de la Torre et al., 2017). Small and medium-sized en-
terprises (SMEs) are important beneficiaries, reflecting the view that they a key
driver of growth and employment. At the same time, they are facing credit con-
straints due to information asymmetries larger companies are less subject to (Beck
and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). During the global financial crisis, development banks
have also engaged in counter-cyclical activities aimed at preventing large-scale
deleveraging with possible negative consequences on SMEs, a key transmission
mechanism of financial crises as evidenced in the Great Depression (Bernanke,
1983). As a result, loan portfolios of promotional and development banks recorded
much stronger growth in the aftermath of the Lehman default than portfolios held
by private commercial banks (de Luna-Martinez and Vicente, 2012).
In many cases these activities have been supported and/or complemented by
supra- and international financial institutions (IFIs) which adopted a variety of
countercyclical financial measures to support SME finance. An example of such a
support is the Joint International Financial Institutions Plan for Growth (JIAP)
funded by EIB, EBRD and the World Bank (Final Report on the Joint IFI action
plan for Growth in Central and South Eastern Europe, 2015).
Given the quantitative dimensions involved comprehensive and reliable impact
assessments of IFI support to SMEs are scarce (Bah et al., 2011; Cassano et al.,
2013; Asdrubali and Signore, 2015. For an overview focusing on developing coun-
tries, see Kersten et al., 2017). This partly reflects the fact that in the devel-
oping world starting with the 1980s promotional and development banks were
seen increasingly critically as many of them regularly recorded losses or failed to
reach the beneficiaries they were supposed to reach (Hellman, 1996; Caprio and
Demirguc-Kunt, 1998). By contrast, in several mature economies, notably in con-
tinental Europe, established promotional banks continued to operate smoothly,
significantly expanding the range of activities and balance sheet volumes (Harries,
1998). However, in a world turning towards bank privatization, financial liberal-
ization and globalization (Porta et al., 2002; Clarke et al., 2005), these institutions
were widely neglected as a research topic (Robinson, 2009; Hanley et al., 2016).
Perspectives changed somewhat after the global financial crisis. While govern-
ment ownership in banking and direct state interventions into the financial sector
via development banks still meet substantial scepticism, mainly due to the gover-
nance challenges involved (World Bank, 2012), the crisis has raised questions on
the role of private sector finance (Zingales, 2015). In the developing world, the rise
of China and India, featuring largely government-owned banks and heavily reg-
ulated financial sectors, triggered new research on the role of government-owned
banks and state interventions into the financial sector (Xiao and Zhao, 2012; Shen
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and Lin, 2012; Andrianova et al., 2012). Moreover, counter-cyclical finance re-
ceived greater attention and most research found that government-owned banks
(Bertay et al., 2015) and development banks (Torres and Zeidan, 2016) contributed
to less severe decline in funding in the immediate post-crisis years.
Against this background, we assess the impact of EIB-supported funding on
SME performance in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) during the global finan-
cial crisis and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. We do so as SMEs represent
one of EIB’s five key operational priorities (EIB, 2013) and the CEE region was
hit hard by the global financial crisis, also in comparison to other emerging mar-
kets regions (Goldstein and Xie (2009), Gallego et al. (2010), Bakker and Klingen
(2012)). Moreover, there is evidence that EIB lending in the region made a larger
difference for beneficiary leverage than in other EU countries (EIB, 2013).
Concretely, we exploit EIB lending data and blend it with publicly available
data on individual SMEs financial and economic performance from the Bureau
van Dijk’s Orbis / Amadeus dataset. By merging both datasets, and applying
propensity score matching we construct a treatment and a control group. This
allows us to run difference-in-difference (DiD) regressions testing whether SMEs
receiving EIB-supported loans provided via local banks perform differently with
respect to outcome variables, such as employment, revenues, profits, profitability
and solvency compared to non-receiving SMEs. Furthermore, to estimate the
effect of the crisis on the effectiveness of EIB lending, we compare the outcomes
of firms located in countries where the crisis continues after firms received EIB
funding, with the outcome of EIB-funded firms located in countries where the
recovery sets in, relative to non-treated firms.
Our results show that firms receiving EIB lending record significantly higher
employment and profitability (measured as EBITDA ratio) than the control group
of firms established by propensity score matching, i.e. firms with similar observable
characteristics as the receiving firms. Moreover, EIB lending has a negative effect
on liquidity and solvency. We interpret the latter effect as an accounting effect:
firms receiving EIB funds by implication become less liquid and solvent compared
to the control group as any investment funded by the EIB loan reduces liquidity
and the funding itself raises leverage, i.e. is associated with a decline in the equity
ratio and hence in firm solvency.
We also find that in crisis times the positive effects of EIB lending are upheld,
i.e. they neither decline nor are they reinforced. An exception is the EBITDA ra-
tio where we find that the impact of EIB lending on the ratio is even larger when
firms face a prolonged crisis period compared to a period of recovery. Overall,
this suggests that the positive impact of EIB lending on revenues and employ-
ment does not depend on post-treatment economic developments in the countries
beneficiaries operate in. EIB funded firms record larger revenues and higher em-
ployment relative to the control group irrespective of the country remaining in
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a recessionary environment after treatment or recovering from the financial crisis
driven downturn.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a rationale for public sector
intervention into SME financing. In Section 3 we explain our data sources. Section
4 provides details concerning our empirical framework, including the propensity
score matching and the difference in difference estimation. In Section 5 we discuss
the results. In section 6 we present the results of the effect of the crisis on the
effectiveness of EIB lending. In section 7 we conclude.
2 Rationale for public sector intervention into
SME financing
Public-sector banks in the form of promotional and development banks have
a long history, in a national and in an international or supranational setting.
Moreover, in some countries and in certain periods these banks account for a
substantial share of lending to the private and public sector in the given economy.
The rationale for public sector involvement in the financial sector supporting
certain target groups, most importantly SMEs, is a market failure (Lazzarini et al.,
2015). Information asymmetries, which can lead to both moral hazard and ad-
verse selection of low quality borrowers, make private sector financial institutions
reluctant to extend credit, especially uncollateralised credit, to SMEs and mid-
cap companies, even at high interest rates (Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Stiglitz and
Weiss, 1981).1 Thus, there is credit rationing, i.e. banks keep the supply of credit
below demand, rather than to increase the interest rate charged on loans. As a
result, many SMEs with economically viable projects are credit constraint (Beck
and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006), i.e. they often cannot obtain funding from the regular
system of financial intermediation.
Credit constraints prevent SMEs from implementing investments with high
marginal returns that would lead them to a better performance with regard to
outcome variables such as production, employment, profitability, liquidity or sol-
vency. This is why the “SME financing gap” (OECD, 2006) is of general economic
policy concern: it signals a loss of aggregate output, employment and productivity
compared to a market solution that would emerge without information asymme-
tries.
1SMEs are more affected by credit rationing than larger companies because decision making
processes, transparency rules, dividing lines between company and personal assets are less defined
for SMEs than for larger companies. Thus, information asymmetries are more pronounced for
small firms and the cost of monitoring them is higher.
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The SME financing gap usually widens in cyclical downturns and crisis periods
as private sector banks become more risk averse given declining equity ratios re-
flecting crisis-related losses (Lee et al., 2015). This effect might be reinforced by
the introduction of tighter regulatory standards, such as the Basel III framework
(EBA, 2016). Empirical evidence shows that low and declining bank capital has a
negative impact on corporate lending activities by banks (Gambacorta and Shin,
2018). Factors related to the SMEs themselves also contribute to a cyclical wors-
ening of the credit rationing. For example, a financial crisis is associated with
sharp drops in real estate prices. As property assets are a key source of collateral
provided by SMEs (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994), the decline in prices aggravates
the funding problem of SMEs. Moreover, financial crises are associated with ris-
ing uncertainty related to the economic outlook which can exacerbate information
asymmetries and result in a further decline in the banks’ willingness to lend to
SMEs.2
In the context of programme evaluation, these considerations provide the basis
for the theory of change underlying the activities of national development and
promotional banks as well as international and supranational financial institu-
tions, such as the EIB. The theory stipulates that (access to) credit represents a
“treatment” of dismal SME performance for outcome variables such as production,
employment, profitability, liquidity and solvency (Figure 1).3
IFIs and promotional banks might facilitate access to credit in two ways:
• First, they mandate financial intermediaries receiving IFI loans to pass some
of the funding advantage intermediaries benefit from on to borrowing SMEs
(transfer-of-financial-advantage (TOFA) clause). For instance, if the market
rate for long-term funding is 4% and the IFI provides loans at 3%, the
SMEs receiving funding from the IFI loan benefit if they have to pay a
lower interest rate on their loan than comparable SMEs funded by resources
intermediaries tap from private capital markets. The financial advantage
can also materialise in loan components other than the cost of borrowing.
For example, in certain cases the IFI-supported loans offer longer maturities
than the normally available ones.
2There is an increasing body of literature studying the impact of financial crises on SME
performance. Results have been mixed. Some studies (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2012) provide
support for the so-called flexible view, indicating a relative growth advantage of small firms
compared to large firms during the crisis. Others find evidence for the fragile view, with small
businesses being identified as more vulnerable in crisis times (Kolasa et al., 2010; Ferrando et al.,
2017; Bartz and Winkler, 2016).
3Indeed, it is the theory of change basically any financial sector involvement by the public
sector is built upon. Another prominent example where this theory of change is made use of is
microfinance (Banerjee et al., 2015).
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Figure 1: The Theory of Change of SME funding by International Financial In-
stitutions (source: EIB, 2013, own compilation)
• Second, the IFI contribution might consist of alleviating constraints on the
intermediary’s funding side, i.e. the IFI line of credit allows the interme-
diary to expand its funding base and by doing so makes it possible for the
intermediary to lend to firms that would otherwise have remained unserved,
at least by the intermediaries receiving IFI funds.
We are unable to differentiate between the above mentioned impact channels
as the available data does not allow us to compare recipients of loans funded by
EIB with recipients of loans funded by other banks’ sources. Such a comparison is
needed for testing the impact of TOFA separately from the impact of IFI funding
as such. However, it can be assumed that both channels gain importance in crisis
compared to non-crisis times. In crisis times, funding conditions deteriorate in
terms of price and quantity, making it more attractive for banks to tap IFI funding
in order to minimize funding costs and to see good clients through difficult times.
Until recently, the validity of this theory of change was seen as given if project
evaluations, regularly conducted by IFIs (see for example Feeny and Vuong (2017))
indicate that SMEs receiving funding from IFIs show an increase in output and
employment, i.e. meet the stipulated goals of the project (a credit line to SMEs).
However, over the last decade it has been increasingly argued that this is not
enough. The theory of change is proven only if compared to a suitable counter-
factual, i.e. if the ‘treated’ firms do better than similar SMEs not receiving EIB
funding, and this ‘doing better’ is caused by the treatment. Our paper aims at
exactly this comparison.
3 Empirical approach
The challenge of impact assessments is that the counterfactual cannot be ob-
served. What we would like to measure is the difference between the mean per-
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formance of the EIB-funded firms, and the mean performance of the same firms,
had they not been beneficiaries of an EIB loan. In other words, we are after the
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). However, we do not know how an
SME would have developed in terms of the outcome variables if it had not received
an EIB loan compared to the observable development with an EIB loan.
It can be shown that under certain assumptions Randomized Control Trials
(RCTs) are able to answer the impact question (Glennerster and Takavarasha,
2013). By randomizing firms receiving and not receiving an EIB loan the firms
which are not treated show on average the same characteristics as those which
are treated. Thus, there is no selection bias into treatment, i.e. treated firms
are on average in no way “different” from non-treated firms. This allows the
researcher to take the outcome variables of the non-treated firms as evidence of
the counterfactual and to measure impact by comparing the change in outcome
variables of treated with the change in outcome variables of the non-treated firms.
However, the RCT methodology cannot be applied to SME credit lines as it is
basically impossible to randomize among firms. Many firms should not get a loan
due to a lack of creditworthiness. Indeed, it is one of the key functions of financial
institutions to select borrowers, i.e. to act in a non-random way with regard to
potential borrowers (Bodie and Merton, 1995). Thus, there is a selection bias
problem. With regard to onlending of IFI funds the bias might take two forms.
First, the on-lending banks might select the best and most promising companies
only, as they aim to avoid the reputation risk via the IFI of not showing good
results in terms of outcomes the IFI cares for. Second, the selection bias might
lead to a selection of risky and low-growth businesses while other firms receive
loans funded via traditional channels, such as deposits or other borrowings. In
both cases, the performance of the non-treated firms in terms of the outcome
variables might not represent the values the treated firms would have achieved if
they had not been treated.
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) addresses the selection bias the treatment
group is subject to by creating a control group among non-treated firms which at
times of treatment are identical to treated firms with respect to observable char-
acteristics4. Thus, after controlling for observable characteristics, receiving an IFI
loan should be “as good as random”, i.e. should meet the conditional indepen-
dence assumption (CIA) which requires that covariates (like firm characteristics)
that may impact the probability of receiving an IFI loan can be observed and that
these are the basis for the selection into treatment.
4The PSM methodology goes back to Rubin (1974) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). An
introduction is provided by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008).
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Besides CIA, there has to be a positive probability of belonging to the IFI
loan receiving firms (the treatment group) as well as to the firms that do not
receive an IFI loan, i.e. receiving an IFI loan is not perfectly predictable ex-ante
(common support condition (CSC)). In other words, there is a sufficient overlap in
the characteristics of firms receiving IFI funding and those that do not in order to
identify adequate matches (i.e. otherwise comparable firms). If these assumptions
are fulfilled it is possible to create out of the group of firms not receiving an IFI
loan a control group representing an unbiased counterfactual for the firms receiving
an IFI loan.
We complement the propensity score matching with estimating the effect of
treatment using a difference-in-differences (DID) estimator. PSM is only able to
account for observable characteristics when addressing the selection bias of the
treatment group. However, treated and non-treated firms might differ with regard
to unobservable confounderss that a) are not perfectly correlated with observables
and b) are important for testing the theory of change. The DID estimator allows us
to control for such unobserved confounders, as long as they remain constant over
time. Furthermore, the DID technique relies on the assumption that in absence of
the treatment, the average outcomes for treated and controls would have followed
parallel trends over time. The parallel trends assumption can be ensured by the
appropriate specification of the propensity score model, and can be tested.
The combination of PSM and DID is often used in the policy evaluation lit-
erature (see for example Javorcik and Sawada, 2018), and also in particular for
impact assessments of SME credit lines. Combining a propensity score matching
approach with difference-in-difference estimations Bah et al. (2011) find that US-
AIDs technical and financial assistance for Macedonian SMEs raised employment
growth rates in the analysed 58 assisted firms (with 764 firms in the control group)
by 16-20 percentage points. Cassano et al. (2013) analyse the impact of European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) programs for Micro, Small
and Medium Sized Enterprises (MSMEs) in selected CEE countries (Bulgaria,
Georgia, Russia and Ukraine) by applying standard regression estimations after a
propensity score matching approach. They find a significant positive effect of cash
flow-based and collateral based loans on most performance indicators (i.e. fixed
assets, revenues and employment).
Endresz et al. (2015) evaluate the impact of the National Bank of Hungary’s
”Funding for Growth” programme on the performance of Hungarian SMEs during
the crisis. Using a modified difference-in-difference framework they find that the
program succeeded in generating extra investment in the SME sector that would
not have taken place otherwise. Banai et al. (2017) investigate the impact of
EU-funded direct subsidies to SMEs in Hungary using propensity score matching
and fixed effects panel regression, and find a significant positive impact on the
number of employees, sales revenue and gross value added. Finally, and closest to
our approach, Asdrubali and Signore (2015) show that SMEs in the Central and
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South Eastern Europe (CESEE) region which received funding guaranteed by the
EU SME Guaranty Facility mainly between 2005 and 2007 recorded an increase
in the number of employees and in sales compared to a respective control group of
SMEs, with the largest impact being observed for micro and young SMEs. Their
results are based on observations of 2,923 firms (treatment and control group).
Further work using credit guarantee data can be found in Bertoni et al. (2018)
and Bertoni et al. (2019a).
We contribute to this literature by assessing the impact of EIB funding to SMEs
covering a substantially larger sample of beneficiaries over a substantially longer
observation period that includes the financial crisis. They also allow us to test
for the impact of the crisis on the impact of EIB funding. Having said this, there
is a potential unobserved, time-varying confounder that our empirical approach
described above – the combination of PSM and difference-in-differences – may not
fully account for. This problem is not unique to our study: it is a feature that is
also present in most of the papers cited above. (See Asdrubali and Signore, 2015,
Bertoni et al., 2018, Bertoni et al., 2019a or Bertoni et al., 2019b. See also Caliendo
et al., 2016 for an explicit discussion of the issue of unobservable confounders in
an empirical application.) The issue is the following. By construction, treated
firms exhibit credit demand at the time of the treatment. Among the firms in
the control group, however, some firms may not have credit demand at that time,
because they lack a profitable investment opportunity. Our identification strategy
cannot account for this type of unobserved heterogeneity, as we do not know which
of the control firms have asked for a loan. As a consequence, in principle, for any
difference in outcome variables we measure between the treatment and the control
groups, we may not be able to determine the extent this difference is attributable
to the effect of an EIB loan, or to a difference in credit demand between the
two groups.5 In line with the literature, however, we argue that the observables
we make use of in the PSM show a strong correlation with the (unobservable)
determinants of credit demand. This suggests that the difference-in-difference
analysis provides us with a proper assessment of the impact of EIB funding. In
addition, we will address this issue in more detail as part of the robustness checks.
5On a similar note, as already mentioned, the fact that we do not have information on the
credit applications of control group firms restricts us to measure the overall effect of EIB loans.
We cannot determine the role of the different channels, e.g. whether the impact on the outcome
variables manifests itself through better conditions, such as the transfer of financial advantage,
or through alleviating credit constraints by providing access to finance to firms that have not




EIB funding products targeting SMEs typically take the form of a Multiple
Beneficiary Intermediated Loan (MBIL). With MBILs, EIB provides a loan to a
financial intermediary. The intermediary is then required to on-lend the amount to
smaller-scale projects and investments, promoted by multiple beneficiaries such as
SMEs, or possibly mid-caps. Potential financial intermediaries include commercial
banks, leasing companies and other financial institutions, and in some cases public
entities such as national promotional banks.
MBILs target improved access to finance and improved financing conditions to
SMEs and possibly mid-caps. As such, they contribute to the EIB public policy
goal of supporting SME and midcap finance. Based on specific eligibility criteria
for final beneficiaries and underlying projects, MBIL operations can also contribute
to other EIB public policy goals and objectives (e.g. innovation and skills, envi-
ronment, infrastructure, climate action, youth employment, agriculture). Projects
eligible for MBILs can include investment in tangible and intangible assets, includ-
ing purchase, leasing or renovation of assets, working capital, etc.
During an agreed allocation period, which is typically 18 or 24 months, the
financial intermediary is required to allocate the EIB loan amount to specific sub-
loans to eligible SMEs. Data on allocation is reported back to the EIB. The reports
include the names of the beneficiaries, the size of the loan and further information
on the companies. In this paper we study the impact of EIB funding on firms
located in the following CESEE countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
EIB funding provides financial advantages to the intermediary financial insti-
tutions which can take the form of lower financing costs, longer maturity etc. In
exchange, the financial intermediary is contractually required to transfer part of
the financial advantage to the final beneficiaries. The standard requirement is
to transfer one third of the EIB financial benefit in the form of lower financing
costs. Alternatively, the EIB financial advantage can be transferred through longer
tenors of sub-loans and/or a one-off payment to final beneficiaries. In addition,
the financial institutions are usually required to provide additional, complemen-
tary lending to SMEs so that their total lending to SMEs is at least the double of
the EIB’s participation.
The tables list in total 142,263 allocations to 103.735 SMEs (i.e. beneficiaries)
between 2008 and 2014. The number of allocations grew steadily over the years,
from 2,299 in 2008 to 40,243 in 2014, which resulted in an increase in the annual
allocated amount from 0.5 billion EUR in 2008 to roughly 2.4 billion EUR in
2014. The bulk of these allocations, 97,205 in total (68%), are allocated to firms
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Figure 2: (i.) Number of allocations and (ii) Total loan amount by country
in Poland. The total volume of funding amounts to 11.3 billion EUR. As the
average funding of Polish firms is substantially below the CESEE average, the
share of the amount allocated to Polish SMEs is 32%, followed by the shares of
firms in the Czech Republic and Hungary (see figure 2). The median amount
allocated to firms is 19,764 EUR, mainly driven by Poland, where the median
allocated amount is around 17,000 EUR. The median allocated amount in the
remaining countries is substantially higher. The median beneficiary employs 9
employees. Firms received funds from 126 intermediaries based on 210 contracts
between the EIB and local intermediaries.
Some beneficiaries have received funding through more than one intermediary
and more than one installment per year. We define treatment as the first in-
stallment of a loan to a beneficiary through any intermediary under any contract
between the EIB and an intermediary. According to this definition, treatment in
a certain year to a certain beneficiary can cover several allocations over several
years through one or more intermediary. The alternative, namely considering ev-
ery allocation as a separate treatment would inflate the number of treatments.
Furthermore, if allocations to a beneficiary span several years, pre-treatment peri-
ods for the later allocations would overlap with the post treatment periods for the
earlier allocations. This would violate the condition for propensity score match-
ing where variables explaining selection into treatment should not be affected by
treatment.
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Figure 3: Total loan amount, number of allocations and number beneficiaries by
year
4.2 Bureau van Dijk Orbis database
The EIB allocation tables do not contain sufficient information on the firm’s
economic and financial performance. In particular, it does not contain any in-
formation on the firms’ performance after the loan was signed and disbursed.
Auxiliary information is therefore necessary to measure and evaluate the SMEs’
performance after the disbursement of the loan.
For this purpose, we merge the allocation tables with the Orbis database in
order to obtain the financial and other firm level data on the beneficiaries. This is
a necessary step for measuring the performance of the beneficiaries, but it is also
required to create a proper control group of similar companies against which the
performance of EIB funded firms is measured.6
6To assure a high quality of the merge, the process was first conducted for the year 2014
for all countries other than Poland, due to an early merging exercise conducted by the EIB
in cooperation with the BvD on the 2014 data. When the quality was deemed sufficient, the
procedure was repeated for the years prior to 2014. The merging was done using the BvD online
batch search tool. The search tool provides an option to upload details of up to 1000 beneficiaries
at a time. In this merging exercise, the details provided were the beneficiary name and country.
Other information would contribute excessive noise into the search procedure and decrease the
number of successful matches. The batch search results in a match if the name/country proximity
of the allocation tables to an Orbis entry is of a quality labeled A. Furthermore, for non A
matches, suggestions of lower proximity are provided. All matches labeled A were kept. For
the non-successful merges for all countries other than Poland a manual merging exercise was
performed among the provided suggestions. For 2014 out of 10,723 allocations 9,006 were found
to have an entry in Orbis. In 6,858 cases the same entry was identified in the EIB/BvD exercise.
In two cases the entry in the Orbis database was different to the one identified in the the
EIB/BvD exercise. Finally, for 2,150 cases, EIB/BvD exercise did not find a match. Partially
this is due to the fact that the EIB/BvD exercise excluded all sole entrepreneurs. For the cases
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Figure 4: Creating the final sample of allocations
Out of 142,263 allocations SMEs from CESEE, 61,309 allocations have an entry
in Orbis database. Of these, 51,618 provide some information on the financials and
24,506 have information for total assets, turnover, the current ratio and net income
in the year of allocation. However, only 8,832 have that information three years
prior and three years after the year of the allocation. Finally, when redefining an
allocation (treatment) to satisfy prerequisites of our methodology, our final sample
is further diminished to 5,223 observations.
The attrition of data is non-negligible, furthermore we cannot assume that data
is missing completely at random (MCAR). Indeed, when considering observable
categorical variables such as country, year, employment and industry classification,
data attrition is not balanced across the categories defined by them. As a conse-
quence, treatment effects calculated based on our final sample can be considered
as sample average treatment effects on the treated (SATT), which cannot necessar-
ily be generalised as population average treatment effects on the treated (PATT).
We partially account for the missing data bias using three different techniques as
part our robustness checks. The key results do not change using these alternative
specifications suggesting that the missing data do not substantially affect the key
conclusions of the analysis.
where EIB/BvD did not find a match it cannot be judged on the quality of the merge. The




Assessing the impact of EIB funding on SME performance demands an econo-
metric approach to establish a causal relationship between EIB allocations and
the performance of SME beneficiaries following an allocation. In establishing a
causal relationship we resort to the Rubin’s causal model. In doing so we have to
overcome the fundamental problem of causal inference, that is that the outcome
for the firms which have received funding in the case in which they have would
not have received it, is unobservable. Due to non-randomness in the allocation
process, firms which have not received EIB funding do not necessarily serve as a
good substitute for the unobserved counterfactual as EIB funded firms may differ
from other firms in characteristics which correlate with their performance after re-
ceiving an allocation. In absence of a natural experiment setting and since random
allocation of funds to asses the impact of funding on performance is unfeasible,
we resort to the established methodology of propensity score matching to obtain
the counterfactuals. These are firms which, if certain assumptions are met, serve
as observations of the firms which have received funding as if they had not. The
most important assumption is that of the conditional independence, which in our
case states that conditioning on observable characteristics, the assignment of an
allocation to a firm is ”as good as random”.
Upon obtaining the counterfactuals we perform a difference in difference esti-
mation of the causal effect of EIB funding on SME performance. Difference in
difference estimation compares the difference in conditional means of performance
after receiving an allocation and before of the firms which have received an alloca-
tion and those which serve as counterfactuals. This provides us with an estimate
for the causal effect of EIB funding on SME performance.
5.1 Sampling and stratification
Based on the merging process just explained, we construct a sample of treated
firms which have received EIB funding. Since several beneficiaries have received
funding through more than one intermediary and more than one installment per
year, we redefine an allocation as a loan or an installment of a loan to a beneficiary
through a single contract between the EIB and an intermediary. Moreover, we
define treatment as the first installment of a loan to a beneficiary through any
intermediary under any contract between the EIB and an intermediary.
We continue by constructing a pool of potential counterfactuals. In doing so
we take into consideration the composition of the pool of treated with regard to
country, year of allocation, size and industry. Accordingly, we define several strata
across these dimensions. To keep granularity at a reasonable level, we define size
groups according to the number of employees and industry groups according to
their primary NACE code. Thus, in total we have
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• 8 countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia,
• 7 years: from 2008 to 2014,
• 5 size groups: 1 employee, from 2 to 10 employees, from 10 to 50 employees,
from 51 to 250 employees, from 251 to 500 employees,
• 6 industry groups.
This adds up to a total of 1680 strata. To ensure that all the strata are rep-
resented we draw a random sample of 10 firms from Orbis financials database for
each strata. This also assures that after the matching procedure each treated firm
has a sufficient probability to have a counterfactual from its own strata. A pre-
condition for a firm to be drawn into a sample of potential counterfactuals is that
it has not received funding and that it has data on key financials for seven con-
secutive years. The financials data on every potential counterfactual is centered
around a year which also defines its cohort. The sampling procedure assures that
firms which have data for more than seven consecutive years do not appear in the
sample as potential counterfactuals more than once.
5.2 Propensity score estimation
In the propensity score model we pool all cohorts, countries, size and industry
groups together. This implies that the data is collapsed in a way that ensures that
every treatment, as defined in the previous section, is considered period t = 0.
This implies that a total of 5,223 treated firms, i.e. firms which have received EIB
funding, are centered around their treatment year (which defines their cohort), and
that all potential counterfactuals are centered around the year which defines their
cohort. To assure the condition that variables that explain selection into treatment
are not affected by the treatment, we estimate the model on pre-treatment data.
Thus, we compute three pre-treatment years averages for all key financials which
are to be included in explaining the selection into treatment.
Following the literature on credit scoring models (Volk, 2014), the following end
of year financial and business data are obtained from Orbis database: the number
of employees, total assets, fixed total assets, tangible fixed assets, intangible fixed
assets, current assets, r&d expenditures, total operating revenues, total export
revenues, ebitda, net income, the solvency ratio, the current ratio and the liquid-
ity ratio. For variables measured in levels, the growth rates and some relevant
ratios are computed. Among the latter are the share of intangible fixed assets in
total fixed assets, the ebitda margin, computed as earnings before interest, tax,
depreciation and amortization over revenues and return on assets, measured as net
income over total assets. Furthermore, all variables expressed in Euro amounts,
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are adjusted for cross country price levels, exchange rate movements and inflation7.
The propensity score model is a probit model explaining selection into treat-
ment, i.e. obtaining EIB funding, using firm financial and demographic data. We
use the following set of financial characteristics to explain the selection process:
size, funding structure, liquidity, revenue generation, profitability, innovativeness
and growth. For each characteristic at least one variable is used. If adding ad-
ditional ratios or variables to a group with a particular significant information
raises the predictive power of the model, the variable is kept. Moreover, we con-
trol for cohort, country, size, industry and cohort-country specific effects. Higher
order terms are included if they prove to be statistically significant and add to the
predictive power of the model.








Change in current ratio -0.0413***
(0.00669)
EBITDA ratio 0.0176*** -0.0000430 -0.00000225***
(0.00129) (0.0000264) (0.000000413)











Number of observations: 29695 Pseudo R2: 0.1789
7Every Euro denominated data point was converted into local currency, adjusted by local
currency GDP deflator to 2010 local prices and then converted to 2010 Euros. To adjust for the
differences across countries these amounts were then multiplied by the 2010 cross country price
index.
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Figure 5: Distribution of the estimated propensity score for the: (i.) treated and
non treated and (ii.) treated and counterfactuals
Table 1 presents the results of the propensity score estimation. The estimated
model provides us with a propensity score that represents the estimated prob-
abilities of being treated conditional on observed characteristics of firms in the
sample. To obtain the list of counterfactuals we need to pair every treated firm
with a counterfactual. We do so using the nearest neighbour technique.8 Each
firm can serve as a counterfactual for only one treated firm. If two treated firms
share the same nearest neighbour, we keep that nearest neighbour for the firm
with the closer propensity score and find the next nearest neighbour excluding the
firm already used.
Figure 5 provides an illustration of the success of the matching process. The left
panel plots the distribution of the estimated propensity score of the treated and
the non-treated. The model is able to discriminate between the two groups in the
8For the benefits and details of nearest neighbour matching see Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008)
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sample with the non-treated evidently more skewed towards zero. The right panel
plots the distribution of the estimated propensity score of the treated and their
nearest neighbours, the counterfactuals. The overlaying graphs provide evidence
that the estimated propensity scores are balanced across the two groups.
Table 9 and Figure 6 illustrate the outcome of the matching process from the
viewpoint of the key observables that enter into the probit model. They confirm
that the matching resulted in a sizable reduction in the difference between the
treated and the control group. The standardised bias indicator is below +/-5 per
cent rule of thumb suggested by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for all variables.
Table 10 displays the key summary statistics for the treated, the potential
controls and matched control sample with respect to our final outcome variables
that we use in the difference-in-difference framework.
5.3 Difference in difference estimation of the causal effects
An important test of the success of our matching strategy before applying the
difference in difference estimation is testing for a common trend of pre-treatment
outcome variables, i.e. whether in the pre-treatment period the chosen counter-
factuals behave in a similar way as EIB funded firms. A violation of the common
trend assumption would indicate that unobserved characteristics, which are not
taken into account in our propensity score model, influence the selection into treat-
ment (i.e. successfully applying for an EIB-funded loan). Moreover divergences
in outcome variables after treatment could not be interpreted as the treatment
effect, i.e. as caused by EIB funding, as they would have been observed already
before treatment with respect to those outcome variables.
yi,t = β0 + β1t+ β2treati + β3treati ∗ t+ εi,t (1)
Concretely, we estimate (1), with yi,t representing the outcome variable of inter-
est for firm i at time t.9 Variable treati is a dummy variable that takes the value
1 if firm i received EIB funding and 0 otherwise. We estimate (1) for observations
preceding the treatment (i.e. t < 0). Variable t represents a linear time trend.
We focus on the coefficient of the interaction term of the treated and the trend,
β3, i.e. in the presence of common trend we expect β3 to be zero. Tables 2 and 3
provide the results of the test for variables where the common trend is confirmed,
i.e. β3 fails to be significantly different. These variables are the log levels of
9In our setup, the time index t represents the time measured in years relative to the year of
the loan allocation. It can take values from -3 to +3, and takes 0 in the year of treatment.
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EBITDA, revenues and employment (Table 2) as well as the EBITDA, current
and solvency ratios (Table 3).
Table 2: Common trends - log variables
(1) (2) (3)
Employment (log) EBITDA (log) Revenues (log)
trend 0.0548∗∗∗ 0.00686 0.0363∗
(0.0168) (0.0203) (0.0192)
treated -0.0231 0.291∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗
(0.0474) (0.0565) (0.0539)
trend*treated 0.000915 0.0279 0.0382
(0.0221) (0.0264) (0.0253)
Constant 3.087∗∗∗ 12.21∗∗∗ 14.51∗∗∗
(0.0363) (0.0438) (0.0413)
Observations 29800 27048 29921
R2 0.001 0.005 0.006
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.004 0.006
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3: Common trends - ratios
(1) (2) (3)
EBITDA ratio Solvency ratio Current ratio
trend -0.00560 1.006∗∗∗ -0.0431
(0.146) (0.272) (0.0353)
treated -0.163 -0.128 0.0706
(0.433) (0.826) (0.0946)
trend*treated -0.00761 -0.0934 0.00417
(0.203) (0.380) (0.0506)
Constant 12.18∗∗∗ 35.59∗∗∗ 1.785∗∗∗
(0.314) (0.596) (0.0661)
Observations 29051 29850 29993
R2 0.000 0.001 0.000
Adjusted R2 -0.000 0.001 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
We continue by estimating the average treatment effect on the treated ATT
with a difference in difference regression and run the following model:
yi,t = β0 + γpostt + δtreati + τ(postt ∗ treati) + εi,t (2)
where yi,t denotes the outcome variable of interest. With this model we test
whether firms receiving EIB funding (treati) on average behave differently in post
treatment periods (postt) than their respective counterfactuals with regards to
asset growth, employment growth, liquidity, solvency and profitability. Thus, the
postt, a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if period t is a post-treatment
period, treati, a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if firm i is a treated firm
(i.e. received EIB funding) are included as separate variables.
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The coefficient of interest in equation 2 is the τ , as it measures the difference
between the treated and non-treated in terms of the outcome variable between
the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods, the ATT. The coefficient τ gives
us the average effect across all post-treatment periods.
We also aim at disentangling the effect between the three post-treatment periods
separately. To this end we define three post-treatment dummies, post 1t, post 2t
and post 3t, which take value 1 if the period t is 1,2 or 3 years after treatment.
Thus we transform equation 2 into:
yi,t = β0 + γ1post 1t + γ2post 2t + γ3post 3t + δtreati
+ τ1(post 1t ∗ treati) + τ2(post 2t ∗ treati)
+ τ3(post 3t ∗ treati) + εi,t (3)
where the interactions between post 1t to post 3t with treati inform about the
direction and the significance of treatment effects in the individual years.
6 Results
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the estimations of models 2 and 3. For each
outcome variable, both models are estimated. Figure 7 in the Appendix shows
visually the pre- and post-treatment developments of the respective variables for
control and treatment group. In brief, our results indicate a significant and positive
effect of EIB funding on profits, revenues, employment and profitability and a
significant negative effect of EIB funding on liquidity and solvency.
There is a significant positive effect on both profits, measured by EBITDA, and
revenues - see columns (3) and (5) in Table 4. The effect of EIB funding is positive
for all post-treatment years for both measures. Whereas the effect on revenues
increases over the post-treatment period (column (6)), the effect on profits peaks
in the second post-treatment year (column (4)).
We also find a significant positive effect on employment, escalating over the post-
treatment years (see columns (1) and (2) in the table 4). Overall the EIB funding
increases employment of SMEs which have received funding by 13%, relative to
those SMEs which have not received EIB funding.
EIB funding is also associated with a positive impact on efficiency (see columns
1 and 2 in Table 5). The significant positive coefficients of the interaction terms
indicate that firms with access to EIB funds do not only increase their capacity
to generate revenues but are also able to reduce costs.
We find negative effects of EIB funding on liquidity and solvency ratios of the
respective beneficiaries compared to the group of counterfactuals. We believe that
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Table 4: Difference-in-differences - log variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
employment (log) EBITDA (log) revenues (log)
treated -0.0165 -0.0165 0.259∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0178) (0.0178)
post 0.00717 -0.00708 -0.0780∗∗∗
(0.0184) (0.0226) (0.0217)
treated × post 0.131∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(0.0238) (0.0290) (0.0280)
post 1 0.0337 -0.0390 -0.0342
(0.0269) (0.0330) (0.0315)
post 2 0.0110 -0.0233 -0.0813∗∗
(0.0270) (0.0338) (0.0321)
post 3 -0.0233 0.0422 -0.119∗∗∗
(0.0272) (0.0339) (0.0333)
treated × post 1 0.0905∗∗∗ 0.0988∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.0346) (0.0422) (0.0404)
treated × post 2 0.138∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.0348) (0.0429) (0.0413)
treated × post 3 0.164∗∗∗ 0.0870∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗
(0.0351) (0.0433) (0.0426)
Constant 2.998∗∗∗ 2.998∗∗∗ 12.20∗∗∗ 12.20∗∗∗ 14.45∗∗∗ 14.45∗∗∗
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0136) (0.0136)
Observations 69487 69487 62135 62135 69852 69852
R2 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5: Difference-in-differences - ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EBITDA ratio Solvency ratio Current ratio
treated -0.0569 -0.0569 -0.580∗∗ -0.580∗∗ 0.0394 0.0394
(0.143) (0.143) (0.272) (0.272) (0.0326) (0.0326)
post -1.955∗∗∗ 3.752∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.329) (0.0413)
treated × post 1.351∗∗∗ -1.992∗∗∗ -0.327∗∗∗
(0.230) (0.447) (0.0553)
post 1 -1.653∗∗∗ 2.589∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗
(0.245) (0.482) (0.0501)
post 2 -2.456∗∗∗ 3.598∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗
(0.262) (0.501) (0.0705)
post 3 -1.757∗∗∗ 5.086∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗
(0.259) (0.510) (0.0698)
treated × post 1 1.079∗∗∗ -2.323∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗
(0.331) (0.650) (0.0721)
treated × post 2 1.736∗∗∗ -1.730∗∗∗ -0.395∗∗∗
(0.349) (0.670) (0.0902)
treated × post 3 1.239∗∗∗ -1.923∗∗∗ -0.412∗∗∗
(0.352) (0.690) (0.0884)
Constant 11.97∗∗∗ 11.97∗∗∗ 34.03∗∗∗ 34.03∗∗∗ 1.882∗∗∗ 1.882∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.104) (0.196) (0.196) (0.0224) (0.0224)
Observations 67712 67712 69270 69270 70065 70065
R2 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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these effects are largely driven by accounting mechanics. By definition funding
from EIB lowers the liquidity position of the receiving firms compared to firms
that do not receive funding if they fund long term assets with short term debt.
Similarly, by taking EIB funded loans the level of debt relative to equity. This has
a negative impact on the solvency ratio of EIB funded firms compared to firms
that do not receive such funding.10
7 Difference in difference in difference estima-
tion of the causal effect of the crisis on the
effectiveness of EIB funding
We extend our impact analysis by accounting for the fact that during the ob-
servation period the economies EIB funded firms opearted in were hit by financial
crises. Thus, EIB lending - at least partly - took place during the crisis. This
raises the question whether the crisis affects the impact of EIB lending on firm
performance. Conceptually, two opposing effects might occur. First, the crisis
could reinforce EIB impact as it gives firms which receive EIB lending a larger
advantage compared to the counterfactuals as the crisis is likely to place stronger
financing constraints on all SMEs. Second, the crisis might dampen the EIB im-
pact on firm performance as it is associated with a decline in aggregate demand,
i.e. a recession. In such an economic environment firms face a tougher challenge
to reap the benefits of an easing in credit constraints provided by EIB funding.
We aim to estimate which of the two effects prevails by obtaining the causal effect
of the crisis on the impact of EIB funding. The emphasis is crucial from a policy
perspective, as it indicates that our results do not answer the question whether
and to what extent EIB funding during the crisis has on average a different ef-
fect than EIB funding in a normal period. We are unable to address the latter
question as this would require to control for the difference between the firms re-
ceiving EIB funding in crisis times and firms receiving in normal times. However,
the observation period starts in 2008 only, i.e. the year of the Lehman brothers
default. Moreover, many CEE countries were also hit by the euro crisis. Thus,
the post-2011 years do not provide a basis either for compiling a sample of firms
receiving EIB funding in normal times and comparing the characteristics of these
firms with the characteristics of beneficiaries in a crisis period.
10An alternative, negative, explanation of the results on liquidity would demand that the
counterfactual firms are able to obtain market funding and that this funding is of longer maturity.
This would however go against the result that the solvency ratio of the treated decreases relative
to the counterfactuals.
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Against this background, we measure the difference in the effect of EIB funding
(the difference-in-difference coefficients) on the outcome variables between the
firms which receive funding during the crisis and for which the crisis continues,
and firms which receive funding during the crisis, but the loan allocation is followed
by non-crisis years. We follow Lo Duca et al. in defining the crisis years in the
countries under review11 and estimate the following model.
yi,t =β0 + β1treati,t + β2posti,t + β3crisisi,t + τ1treati,tposti,t
+ β4treati,tcrisisi,t + β5posti,tcrisisi,t + τ2treati,tposti,tcrisisi,t + εi,t (4)
where crisisi,t is a dummy variable indicating whether the crisis continued for a
beneficiary after receiving an allocation. The coefficient of interest, τ2, estimates
the effect of a continuing crisis on the effectiveness of EIB funding. 12
Table 6 indicates that the economic developments differ substantially when
countries are in crisis compared to a non-crisis period. While the change in real
GDP growth between a crisis year and a continuing crisis year is on average -0.14
p.p., the average change in GDP growth between a crisis year and the first post
crisis year is 0.68 p.p.. Furthermore, on average GDP growth for the three years
following a crisis year is 0.20% if the crisis continues, while the three year average
post crisis growth rate is 1.68%.
Table 6: Crisis and non crisis economic outcomes
∆ gdp growth 3y average gdp growth
non crisis 0.68 1.68
crisis -0.14 0.20
Source: own calculation based on crisis definition provided by Lo Duca et al. (2017)
Tables 7 and 8 provide the results of the difference in difference in difference
estimation of the effect of the crisis on the effectiveness of EIB lending. For every
outcome variable of interest a regular difference in difference model is estimated
11Financial crises: Croatia: 2008 to 2012, Hungary: 2009 to 2010, Romania: 2008 to 2010,
Slovenia: 2010 to 2014, Bulgaria: 2008 to 2010, Czech Republic: 2008 to 2010, Poland: 2008 to
2009, Slovakia: 2009 to 2010.
12As already mentioned, a better setting to control for the composition of firms for the crisis
and non crisis cohorts would be the one where the analysis would only focus on the firms
which have received funding in normal periods and contrast the outcome for firms which have
experienced a crisis in post treatment years against the outcome for firms for which normal times
continued. This is due to the fact that one would expect that economic outcomes differ more
between the first crisis year and a continuing non-crisis period than they do between the first
post crisis year and a continuing crisis period. Our data does not, however, allow us to conduct
such an analysis due to a lack of observations where an allocation was made before the crisis
and a crisis followed.
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on the narrowed sample, i.e. a sample of firms which fit into either of the two
categories, (columns denoted (DD)) and the difference in difference in difference
model (denoted (DDD)). The coefficients of interest are those of the triple inter-
action terms indicating that an allocation is: a) followed by a crisis (crisis), b) the
period is a post treatment period (post) and c) that a firm was treated (treat).
Table 7: diff-in-diff-in-diff: log variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ebitda (log) revenue (log) employment (log)
treated 0.380∗∗∗ 0.0287 0.384∗∗∗ -0.00930 0.0686∗∗∗ -0.294∗∗∗
(0.0245) (0.0318) (0.0233) (0.0303) (0.0203) (0.0262)
post -0.0130 0.00407 -0.0798∗∗∗ -0.0590 0.00580 0.0117
(0.0300) (0.0383) (0.0286) (0.0361) (0.0244) (0.0313)
treated × post 0.0573 0.00981 0.131∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.0382) (0.0495) (0.0365) (0.0475) (0.0311) (0.0403)
crisis -0.406∗∗∗ -0.473∗∗∗ -0.499∗∗∗
(0.0387) (0.0365) (0.0318)
post × crisis -0.0409 -0.0499 -0.0129
(0.0611) (0.0583) (0.0492)
treated × crisis 0.852∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗
(0.0493) (0.0467) (0.0408)
post × treated × crisis 0.108 0.0251 0.000587
(0.0769) (0.0735) (0.0626)
constant 12.19∗∗∗ 12.36∗∗∗ 14.45∗∗∗ 14.65∗∗∗ 3.011∗∗∗ 3.218∗∗∗
(0.0190) (0.0243) (0.0179) (0.0226) (0.0158) (0.0202)
N 35021 35021 39289 39289 39115 39115
R2 0.013 0.029 0.015 0.033 0.002 0.023
adj. R2 0.013 0.029 0.015 0.033 0.002 0.022
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Columns (DDD) in Table 7 indicate that the crisis does not affect the impact
of EIB funding on profits, revenues and employment. While the overall effect of
EIB lending continues to be significant and positive for revenues and employment,
it does not matter whether EIB funded firms face a prolonged crisis after the
loan allocation relative to those firms that experience a recovery of the respective
economies after taking the loan. A similar result holds for the current and the
solvency ratios. While the analysis confirms the overall negative effect (τ1), the
crisis has no significant impact on the impact of EIB funding. The exception to
the rule is the EBITDA ratio with a significant positive coefficient for the triple
interaction term. Thus, there is some evidence that the crisis raises the impact
of EIB funding on the EBITDA ratio. Overall, the analysis suggests that the
positive effects found in the baseline regressions (Tables 4 and 5) hold irrespective
of economic conditions in the post-treatment period. It does not matter for EIB
impact whether the economies the beneficiaries operated in a post-treatment pe-
riod characterized by a prolonged crisis or whether the post-treatment years show
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Table 8: diff-in-diff-in-diff: ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ebitda ratio current ratio solvency ratio
treated 0.494∗ 0.211 -0.214∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.330 0.537
(0.283) (0.244) (0.0595) (0.0520) (0.550) (0.461)
post -1.797∗∗∗ -1.857∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 2.278∗∗∗ 4.116∗∗∗
(0.369) (0.286) (0.0834) (0.0618) (0.722) (0.552)
treated × post 1.589∗∗∗ 0.360 -0.268∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗ -1.552∗ -2.178∗∗∗
(0.462) (0.395) (0.100) (0.0938) (0.898) (0.769)
crisis -0.338 0.262∗∗∗ 2.039∗∗∗
(0.283) (0.0567) (0.544)
post × crisis 0.0597 -0.0904 -1.839∗∗
(0.467) (0.104) (0.909)
treated × crisis 0.283 -0.430∗∗∗ -0.208
(0.373) (0.0790) (0.717)
post × treated × crisis 1.229∗∗ -0.0599 0.626
(0.607) (0.137) (1.182)
cons 11.58∗∗∗ 11.92∗∗∗ 2.010∗∗∗ 1.748∗∗∗ 35.18∗∗∗ 33.14∗∗∗
(0.227) (0.169) (0.0474) (0.0311) (0.435) (0.326)
N 15682 38031 16331 39388 16179 39025
R2 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.003
adj. R2 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.003
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
already a recovery from the crisis.13
8 Robustness checks
We run a series of robustness checks to assess whether and to what degree
our baseline results are sensitive to changes in the sample and the methodology
applied.
Alternative specification of the control group - exact matching by coun-
try and cohort. We start by imposing on the matching exercise the condition
that the nearest neighbor, i.e. the counterfactual, represents the same country and
cohort as the treated firm. In other words, each treated firm from a given country
that receives a loan in a given year is matched with a control firm from the same
country and the same year. Results for our main difference-in-differences estima-
tion (Equation 2) using this alternative specification for the control group can be
found in Tables 11 and 12 in the Appendix. They confirm that the estimated
13It should be noted that this conclusion is strictly limited to the impact on individual SME
borrowers, i.e. it does not imply that the overall macroeconomic impact of EIB funding is
unaltered by economic developments.
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coefficients are of similar magnitude as under our baseline.
Group fixed effects. We continue by running the baseline DID estimation
(Equation 2) by controlling for industry, country, cohort and country-cohort fixed
effects not only at the propensity score estimation, but also in the estimation of
the impact of EIB lending (Tables 13 and 14 in the Appendix). By doing so, we
control for potential unobserved heterogeneity that may be associated with the
group categories, for example macroeconomic factors. The results suggest that
the addition of group fixed eeffects to the baseline regression does not change the
parameter values and their significance in any substantial manner.
Addressing the potential bias from missing data. As shown in section
4.2, we lose a significant proportion of our initial observations during the merging
procedure with ORBIS. Out of 142,263 initial allocations we can only use 5,223
observations in the econometric analysis. The reasons for data attrition include
unsuccessful matching of company names in the ORBIS dataset, missing data in
ORBIS and the exclusion of multiple allocations to the same firm from the sample.
We cannot assume that the data is missing completely at random (MCAR).
When grouping the data by observable categorical variables such as country, year,
employment and industry classification, the share of missing data is not balanced
across these categories. As a consequence, treatment effects calculated based on
our final sample can be considered as sample average treatment effects on the
treated (SATT), which cannot necessarily be generalised as population average
treatment effects on the treated (PATT). We use two different exercises to gain
insight on whether and to what extent the missing data problem is distorting our
results.
First, we use inverse probability weights - a technique widely used to correct
for survey non-response - to approximate the statistical properties of the original
population with respect to some observed variables, and re-estimate our model
on a weighted data set. We use five employment size categories and six industry
classes as strata generating-variables. Within each of the resulting 30 strata, we
re-weight the observations such that the overall weight of the given stratum in
the final sample would match the weight of the same stratum in the original
allocation data-set. In other words, we overweight those observations that belong
to strata with above average missing data, and underweight those coming from
strata with less-than-average missing data. The resulting re-weighted sample can
be considered representative of the original sample with respect to employment
size and industry classification, and we can use the weighted sample to eliminate
the missing data bias that are associated with the uneven data attrition along
these two variables. The diff-in-diff results using the inverse probability weighted
sample are reported in Tables 15 and 16 in the Appendix. They are in line with
our baseline results, suggesting that our findings are robust to the effects of data
attrition.
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Second, we re-calculate our results on a sub-sample of firms from Romania,
which is the country where the missing data problem is the least prevalent. Out
of 3,867 unique Romanian firms in the allocation dataset we identify 1,372 with
the needed data in ORBIS. In other words, 35.5 per cent of Romanian firms in
the original data are also represented in our final sample, in contrast to the 5 per
cent value of CESEE in general. The idea is that if the results hold in Romania,
where missing data is much less of a problem than elsewhere, this would indicate
that the findings are robust to the missing data bias. We run the matching for
Romania only, and then re-estimate the baseline diff-in-diff equation using this
restricted sample. The results - reported in Tables 17 and 18 of the Appendix -
are close to the baseline specification, indicating that our results could possibly
generalised beyond the SATT.
Cluster-robust inference. Bertrand et al. (2003) highlight that the traditional
difference-in-differences estimators do not necessarily account for the serial cor-
relation of the error term that occurs when multiple time periods are observed
before and/or after the treatment. As a consequence, regression standard errors
may be underestimated in these cases. In order to eliminate the serial correlation
for these clustered observations, Bertrand et al. (2003) propose to calculate pre-
and post-treatment means of the outcome variables, and run the DID regressions
using these average outcomes. We follow this suggestion. The results with the
new parameter estimates, together with the standard errors, are given in Table 19
and Table 20. It appears that the correction for the serial correlation of the errors
does not affect the statistical significance of our results.
Controlling for credit demand One of the potential drawbacks of our baseline
analysis is that we cannot determine if we are measuring the impact of an EIB-
supported loan, or simply the difference in performance between firms who have
exhibited credit demand and those who have not. In other words, it is possible
that among the firms in the control group, some firms may not have had profitable
investment projects to be funded, and therefore they may just simply not have
exhibited credit demand.
We address this drawback by adding an extra condition at the probit model
which aims at capturing non-treated firms with credit demand when selecting the
control group. The additional condition we impose reflects the fact that we observe
in the treatment group a significant decline in the solvency ratio in the year of
treatment. As already mentioned, we interpret this as an increase in leverage due
to external finance, i.e. the EIB-funded loans the firms receive. When selecting
the control group, we choose firms showing a similar deterioration in the solvency
ratio in the same year. Following our interpretation, this also indicates the use
of external finance, i.e. we restrict our control group to firms that presumably
exhibited credit demand at the same time as the treated firms and received a
loan.
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Against this background, we add the change in the leverage ratio in the treat-
ment year to the probit model, and we use the corresponding model for the propen-
sity score matching.14 The matching technique and the following DID regressions
remain unchanged. The results are presented in Table 21 and Table 22 of the
Appendix, as well as Figure 8 in the Appendix. The difference in the solvency
ratio between the two groups diminishes to a minimum, indicating that the match
is successful. For the remaining outcome variables we find similar differences be-
tween the two groups as in the baseline. From this we conclude that our results
also hold when comparing treated firms only with those firms showing positive
credit demand.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we assess the impact of EIB funding on SME performance in
Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (CESEE) during 2008-2014, a period
significantly affected by the global financial crisis and the Eurozone sovereign debt
crisis.
Our results, derived from a propensity score matching and difference-in-difference
estimation exercise are consistent with the rationale of public sector intervention
into SME financing and the theory of change underlying the activities of Inter-
national Financial Institutions. Moreover, they reinforce the results of previous
studies on the impact of IFI support for a period of financial crisis, and based
on dataset involving a substantially larger group of treated and non-treated firms
and a longer observation period than used in other studies. Concretely, our results
indicate that EIB lending has a positive effect on employment, revenues, profits
and profitability. Moreover, EIB funded firms record a decline in liquidity and sol-
vency. We believe that these effect are driven by accounting mechanics, as firms
receiving EIB funds by implication become less liquid and solvent compared to
the control group as any investment funded by the EIB loan reduces liquidity and
the funding itself raises leverage.
We also find that the positive impact of EIB funding on employment and rev-
enues is not substantially different when firms face a prolonged crisis after the loan
allocation, relative to the case of a rapid subsequent recovery. We only detect a
14Generally it is not recommended in the literature to use observations potentially influenced
by the treatment in the propensity score model (see for example Imbens (2004)). It is due to the
fact that the use of such observations can bias the selection of the control group towards units
that match the post-treatment dynamics of the treated. This may lead the model to under-
estimate the treatment effect. In our case, however, this alternative specification is used to
confirm the validity of our baseline results by testing whether they hold in spite of this potential
under-estimation.
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slightly more positive impact on profitability for those firms that face a prolonged
crisis. In this respect, our results are reassuring as they point to a consistently
positive impact of IFI funding in a crisis situation irrespective of how the economy
evolves in the post-treatment period.
Overall, we conclude that EIB lending during the observation period made a
difference. Given the general constraints related to the chosen methodology our
results provide support to the view that EIB funding supported employment,
revenues and profitability of SMEs in CESEE countries in a period characterized
by financial and economic turmoil.
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Appendices
Table 9: Balancing properties
Unmatched Mean Reduction t-test
Variable Matched Treated Control Bias (%) in bias (%) t P
Real U 7.70E+06 1.30E+07 -7 -3.57 0
revenue M 7.70E+06 8.60E+06 -1.1 84.4 -2.19 0.028
Solvency U 33.264 37.3 -14.2 -8.61 0
ratio M 33.288 33.307 -0.1 99.5 -0.04 0.97
Current U 1.9403 2.4441 -15.4 -9.12 0
ratio M 1.9309 1.8712 1.8 88.2 1.15 0.249
EBITDA U 12.039 11.038 7.3 4.4 0
ratio M 12.023 12.202 -1.3 82.2 -0.73 0.463
Change in U 0.18449 0.98933 -2.1 -1.06 0.289
employment M 0.18464 0.2127 -0.1 96.5 -1.8 0.071
Log U 2.9713 2.7761 12.5 7.62 0
employment M 2.9646 3.0111 -3 76.1 -1.53 0.127
Change in U -0.25211 -0.45626 2.5 1.4 0.161
EBITDA ratio M -0.25013 -0.26442 0.2 93 0.12 0.908
Change in U -0.03886 0.13637 -9.6 -5.94 0
current ratio M -0.02423 -0.00648 -1 89.9 -0.59 0.554
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Figure 6: Balancing properties
Table 10: Summary statistics
Potential controls
count mean p50 sd
Employment (log) 193522 2.6 2.6 1.8
EBITDA (log) 147663 12.0 12.0 2.1
Revenues (log) 194649 13.9 14.0 2.3
EBITDA ratio 170208 10.2 8.1 18.6
Solvency ratio 188908 38.4 39.6 35.4
Current ratio 197680 2.8 1.3 5.7
Matched controls
count mean p50 sd
Employment (log) 34783 3.0 2.9 1.7
EBITDA (log) 30282 12.2 12.3 1.9
Revenues (log) 34916 14.4 14.5 2.0
EBITDA ratio 33581 11.1 8.7 15.2
Solvency ratio 34590 35.6 35.2 29.7
Current ratio 35063 2.1 1.3 3.7
Matched treated
count mean p50 sd
Employment (log) 34704 3.0 3.0 1.4
EBITDA (log) 31853 12.5 12.6 1.6
Revenues (log) 34936 14.8 14.8 1.6
EBITDA ratio 34131 11.6 9.4 14.1
Solvency ratio 34680 34.2 33.3 27.5
Current ratio 35002 2.0 1.2 3.4
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Figure 7: Impact graphs
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Table 11: Difference-in-differences with PSM by country and cohort
- log variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
employment (log) EBITDA (log) revenues (log)
treated -0.0624∗∗∗ -0.0624∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗
(0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0182) (0.0182)
post -0.00371 -0.0191 -0.0747∗∗∗
(0.0187) (0.0230) (0.0220)
treated × post 0.139∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(0.0242) (0.0295) (0.0285)
post 1 0.0258 -0.0403 -0.0442
(0.0273) (0.0335) (0.0321)
post 2 -0.00235 -0.0375 -0.0793∗∗
(0.0275) (0.0345) (0.0326)
post 3 -0.0347 0.0214 -0.101∗∗∗
(0.0276) (0.0345) (0.0332)
treated × post 1 0.0955∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.0352) (0.0430) (0.0413)
treated × post 2 0.150∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
(0.0354) (0.0438) (0.0420)
treated × post 3 0.173∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.0357) (0.0442) (0.0429)
Constant 3.021∗∗∗ 3.021∗∗∗ 12.23∗∗∗ 12.23∗∗∗ 14.46∗∗∗ 14.46∗∗∗
(0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0138) (0.0138)
Observations 67130 67130 59910 59910 67510 67510
R2 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.007
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.007
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 12: Difference-in-differences with PSM by country and cohort
- ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EBITDA ratio Solvency ratio Current ratio
treated 0.0774 0.0774 -0.617∗∗ -0.617∗∗ 0.0101 0.0101
(0.148) (0.148) (0.281) (0.281) (0.0343) (0.0343)
post -1.764∗∗∗ 4.397∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗
(0.178) (0.335) (0.0447)
treated × post 1.244∗∗∗ -2.656∗∗∗ -0.352∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.456) (0.0586)
post 1 -1.597∗∗∗ 3.095∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(0.257) (0.491) (0.0600)
post 2 -2.058∗∗∗ 4.466∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗
(0.273) (0.502) (0.0643)
post 3 -1.638∗∗∗ 5.645∗∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗
(0.270) (0.516) (0.0820)
treated × post 1 1.112∗∗∗ -2.863∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗∗
(0.343) (0.665) (0.0803)
treated × post 2 1.416∗∗∗ -2.612∗∗∗ -0.327∗∗∗
(0.360) (0.678) (0.0866)
treated × post 3 1.203∗∗∗ -2.495∗∗∗ -0.491∗∗∗
(0.363) (0.703) (0.0993)
Constant 11.70∗∗∗ 11.70∗∗∗ 34.09∗∗∗ 34.09∗∗∗ 1.928∗∗∗ 1.928∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.110) (0.203) (0.203) (0.0242) (0.0242)
Observations 65372 65372 66890 66890 67728 67728
R2 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.003
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.003
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 13: Difference-in-differences, controlling for industry, coun-
try, cohort and country-cohort fixed effects - log variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
employment (log) EBITDA (log) revenues (log)
treated -0.0316∗∗ -0.0316∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗
(0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0169) (0.0169)
post 0.00726 -0.00832 -0.0792∗∗∗
(0.0176) (0.0222) (0.0210)
treated × post 0.131∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
(0.0225) (0.0280) (0.0267)
post 1 0.0342 -0.0381 -0.0349
(0.0257) (0.0323) (0.0305)
post 2 0.0109 -0.0247 -0.0829∗∗∗
(0.0259) (0.0331) (0.0312)
post 3 -0.0235 0.0389 -0.120∗∗∗
(0.0261) (0.0332) (0.0323)
treated × post 1 0.0903∗∗∗ 0.0997∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(0.0327) (0.0407) (0.0385)
treated × post 2 0.138∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.0329) (0.0414) (0.0394)
treated × post 3 0.164∗∗∗ 0.0871∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
(0.0333) (0.0419) (0.0407)
Constant 3.898∗∗∗ 3.898∗∗∗ 13.53∗∗∗ 13.53∗∗∗ 15.50∗∗∗ 15.50∗∗∗
(0.0978) (0.0977) (0.254) (0.254) (0.203) (0.203)
Observations 69487 69487 62135 62135 69852 69852
R2 0.108 0.108 0.077 0.077 0.105 0.105
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.108 0.076 0.076 0.104 0.104
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 14: Difference-in-differences, controlling for industry, coun-
try, cohort and country-cohort fixed effects - ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EBITDA ratio Solvency ratio Current ratio
treated 0.0799 0.0799 -0.714∗∗∗ -0.714∗∗∗ 0.0366 0.0366
(0.137) (0.137) (0.266) (0.266) (0.0325) (0.0325)
post -1.946∗∗∗ 3.706∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.324) (0.0411)
treated × post 1.317∗∗∗ -1.993∗∗∗ -0.326∗∗∗
(0.222) (0.436) (0.0549)
post 1 -1.653∗∗∗ 2.559∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.474) (0.0497)
post 2 -2.436∗∗∗ 3.545∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗
(0.256) (0.494) (0.0700)
post 3 -1.750∗∗∗ 5.031∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗
(0.253) (0.502) (0.0693)
treated × post 1 1.045∗∗∗ -2.318∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗
(0.318) (0.633) (0.0715)
treated × post 2 1.692∗∗∗ -1.723∗∗∗ -0.395∗∗∗
(0.338) (0.654) (0.0896)
treated × post 3 1.216∗∗∗ -1.938∗∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗
(0.341) (0.676) (0.0878)
Constant 21.40∗∗∗ 21.40∗∗∗ 33.32∗∗∗ 33.32∗∗∗ 1.472∗∗∗ 1.472∗∗∗
(2.414) (2.414) (2.947) (2.941) (0.121) (0.122)
Observations 67712 67712 69270 69270 70065 70065
R2 0.076 0.076 0.052 0.053 0.017 0.017
Adjusted R2 0.075 0.075 0.052 0.052 0.016 0.016
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 15: Inverse probability weighted diff-in-diff - log variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
employment (log) EBITDA (log) revenues (log)
treated -0.749∗∗∗ -0.749∗∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗ -0.479∗∗∗ -0.479∗∗∗
(0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0282) (0.0282)
post 0.0174 0.0141 -0.0777∗∗
(0.0268) (0.0334) (0.0323)
treated × post 0.188∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗
(0.0365) (0.0443) (0.0449)
post 1 0.0403 -0.0318 -0.0195
(0.0391) (0.0501) (0.0452)
post 2 0.0218 -0.0163 -0.0820∗
(0.0388) (0.0510) (0.0475)
post 3 -0.0100 0.0931∗∗ -0.132∗∗
(0.0399) (0.0468) (0.0531)
treated × post 1 0.131∗∗ 0.155∗∗ 0.158∗∗
(0.0534) (0.0660) (0.0629)
treated × post 2 0.194∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗
(0.0529) (0.0652) (0.0662)
treated × post 3 0.239∗∗∗ 0.119∗ 0.253∗∗∗
(0.0536) (0.0629) (0.0711)
Constant 2.932∗∗∗ 2.932∗∗∗ 12.14∗∗∗ 12.14∗∗∗ 14.38∗∗∗ 14.38∗∗∗
(0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0195) (0.0195)
Observations 69487 69487 62135 62135 69852 69852
R2 0.046 0.046 0.007 0.007 0.012 0.012
Adjusted R2 0.046 0.046 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.012
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 16: Inverse probability weighted diff-in-diff - ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EBITDA ratio Solvency ratio Current ratio
treated 1.089∗∗∗ 1.089∗∗∗ -3.371∗∗∗ -3.371∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗
(0.274) (0.274) (0.442) (0.442) (0.0670) (0.0670)
post -2.153∗∗∗ 3.957∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗
(0.259) (0.497) (0.0602)
treated × post 1.590∗∗∗ -1.936∗∗∗ -0.364∗∗∗
(0.439) (0.731) (0.0997)
post 1 -1.868∗∗∗ 2.846∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗
(0.381) (0.746) (0.0818)
post 2 -2.685∗∗∗ 3.715∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗
(0.442) (0.773) (0.0978)
post 3 -1.908∗∗∗ 5.329∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗
(0.368) (0.743) (0.0929)
treated × post 1 1.284∗∗ -2.967∗∗∗ -0.225
(0.624) (1.077) (0.150)
treated × post 2 1.725∗∗ -1.587 -0.469∗∗∗
(0.687) (1.112) (0.145)
treated × post 3 1.768∗∗∗ -1.232 -0.397∗∗∗
(0.649) (1.108) (0.138)
Constant 12.30∗∗∗ 12.30∗∗∗ 33.93∗∗∗ 33.93∗∗∗ 1.940∗∗∗ 1.940∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.147) (0.294) (0.294) (0.0357) (0.0357)
Observations 67712 67712 69270 69270 70065 70065
R2 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.001 0.002
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.001 0.002
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 17: Difference-in-differences, Romania only - log variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
employment (log) EBITDA (log) revenues (log)
treated -0.688∗∗∗ -0.688∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗
(0.0319) (0.0319) (0.0407) (0.0407) (0.0392) (0.0392)
post 0.0672∗ 0.0748 -0.0380
(0.0386) (0.0494) (0.0480)
treated × post 0.137∗∗∗ 0.102 0.197∗∗∗
(0.0488) (0.0631) (0.0616)
post 1 0.0975∗ 0.00851 0.00240
(0.0556) (0.0731) (0.0699)
post 2 0.0725 0.0665 -0.0506
(0.0568) (0.0728) (0.0710)
post 3 0.0307 0.151∗∗ -0.0663
(0.0576) (0.0737) (0.0725)
treated × post 1 0.0847 0.0949 0.174∗
(0.0703) (0.0925) (0.0892)
treated × post 2 0.149∗∗ 0.143 0.217∗∗
(0.0715) (0.0918) (0.0908)
treated × post 3 0.178∗∗ 0.0695 0.200∗∗
(0.0726) (0.0943) (0.0933)
Constant 3.220∗∗∗ 3.220∗∗∗ 12.19∗∗∗ 12.19∗∗∗ 14.27∗∗∗ 14.27∗∗∗
(0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0314) (0.0314) (0.0303) (0.0303)
Observations 17375 17375 15216 15216 17824 17824
R2 0.040 0.040 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.039 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.002
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 18: Difference-in-differences, Romania only - ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EBITDA ratio Solvency ratio Current ratio
treated 0.323 0.323 -4.041∗∗∗ -4.041∗∗∗ 0.0679 0.0679
(0.318) (0.318) (0.616) (0.616) (0.0796) (0.0796)
post -2.827∗∗∗ 5.576∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗
(0.384) (0.741) (0.0906)
treated × post 1.535∗∗∗ -3.088∗∗∗ -0.422∗∗∗
(0.531) (1.021) (0.122)
post 1 -2.741∗∗∗ 4.085∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗
(0.554) (1.088) (0.117)
post 2 -3.557∗∗∗ 5.447∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗
(0.613) (1.112) (0.126)
post 3 -2.173∗∗∗ 7.229∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗
(0.597) (1.148) (0.166)
treated × post 1 1.519∗∗ -4.015∗∗∗ -0.233
(0.757) (1.499) (0.167)
treated × post 2 2.121∗∗∗ -2.676∗ -0.438∗∗∗
(0.814) (1.521) (0.166)
treated × post 3 0.954 -2.538 -0.597∗∗∗
(0.833) (1.591) (0.198)
Constant 12.13∗∗∗ 12.13∗∗∗ 30.09∗∗∗ 30.09∗∗∗ 2.034∗∗∗ 2.034∗∗∗
(0.220) (0.220) (0.447) (0.447) (0.0527) (0.0527)
Observations 17054 17054 17429 17429 17934 17934
R2 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.012 0.002 0.002
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.011 0.002 0.002
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 19: Cluster-robust (BDM) estimation - log variables
(1) (2) (3)
Employment (log) EBITDA (log) Revenues (log)
treated -0.0466 0.240∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.0305) (0.0362) (0.0345)
post 0.00656 -0.0383 -0.0958∗∗
(0.0333) (0.0406) (0.0388)
treated × post 0.155∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗
(0.0433) (0.0525) (0.0503)
Constant 3.011∗∗∗ 12.16∗∗∗ 14.49∗∗∗
(0.0231) (0.0277) (0.0262)
Observations 19997 18563 20030
R2 0.001 0.008 0.009
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.008 0.009
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 20: Cluster-robust (BDM) estimation - ratios
(1) (2) (3)
EBITDA ratio Solvency ratio Current ratio
treated -0.178 -0.0188 0.0597
(0.243) (0.508) (0.0518)
post -2.408∗∗∗ 3.626∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗
(0.265) (0.575) (0.0610)
treated × post 1.592∗∗∗ -2.430∗∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗
(0.364) (0.789) (0.0824)
Constant 12.20∗∗∗ 33.31∗∗∗ 1.871∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.359) (0.0360)
Observations 19906 19951 20036
R2 0.005 0.003 0.004
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.003 0.003
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 21: Difference-in-differences - log variables, solvency ratio
matched at treatment year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
employment (log) EBITDA (log) revenues (log)
treated -0.0510∗∗∗ -0.0510∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0178) (0.0178)
post -0.00367 -0.00686 -0.0765∗∗∗
(0.0184) (0.0228) (0.0216)
treated × post 0.139∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗
(0.0238) (0.0292) (0.0279)
post 1 0.0216 -0.0405 -0.0397
(0.0269) (0.0333) (0.0315)
post 2 0.00112 -0.0105 -0.0781∗∗
(0.0270) (0.0340) (0.0320)
post 3 -0.0339 0.0318 -0.112∗∗∗
(0.0272) (0.0341) (0.0329)
treated × post 1 0.101∗∗∗ 0.0968∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(0.0347) (0.0425) (0.0404)
treated × post 2 0.145∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(0.0348) (0.0431) (0.0412)
treated × post 3 0.171∗∗∗ 0.0930∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.0351) (0.0435) (0.0423)
Constant 3.042∗∗∗ 3.042∗∗∗ 12.20∗∗∗ 12.20∗∗∗ 14.47∗∗∗ 14.47∗∗∗
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0136) (0.0136)
Observations 68904 68904 61652 61652 69251 69251
R2 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 22: Difference-in-differences - ratios, solvency ratio matched
at treatment year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EBITDA ratio Solvency ratio Current ratio
treated 0.258∗ 0.258∗ -0.135 -0.135 0.0275 0.0275
(0.143) (0.143) (0.271) (0.271) (0.0338) (0.0338)
post -1.922∗∗∗ 2.477∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.331) (0.0424)
treated × post 1.257∗∗∗ -0.791∗ -0.296∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.446) (0.0563)
post 1 -1.896∗∗∗ 1.146∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗
(0.246) (0.488) (0.0574)
post 2 -2.112∗∗∗ 2.439∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗
(0.263) (0.501) (0.0674)
post 3 -1.754∗∗∗ 3.868∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗
(0.266) (0.515) (0.0706)
treated × post 1 1.268∗∗∗ -0.948 -0.182∗∗
(0.331) (0.651) (0.0777)
treated × post 2 1.343∗∗∗ -0.634 -0.353∗∗∗
(0.348) (0.668) (0.0873)
treated × post 3 1.157∗∗∗ -0.798 -0.354∗∗∗
(0.357) (0.693) (0.0896)
Constant 11.75∗∗∗ 11.75∗∗∗ 33.87∗∗∗ 33.87∗∗∗ 1.906∗∗∗ 1.906∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.104) (0.197) (0.197) (0.0235) (0.0235)
Observations 67134 67134 68967 68967 69447 69447
R2 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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